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Abstract 
In the present article I will discuss cetrain implications of regime change in political 
culture. The main research question will attempt to address how transition from an 
authoritarian rule to a democratic model of government affects the structure of 
political culture. I will demonstrate the empirical implications of my argument 
taking the case of democratization in Slovenia between 1991 and 2004. In order to 
do so I will analyze statistical data sets 'Values in Transition' compiled by the Public 
Opinion and Mass Communication Research Center at the University of Ljubljana. 
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要旨 
本論文では、政権交代が政治文化に及ぼす影響を論じる。特に民主化が進行
する中での政治文化の構造変化を考察する。具体的には、1991年から 2004年
までスロベニアでの民主化のケースを取り上げ、リュブリャナ大学の世論マ
スコミ研究所が集計した統計データを分析し、民主主義や共産主義の政治価
値の変化を検討する。 
 
キーワード：スロベニア、政治文化、共産主義、民主儀化、政治価値 
 
   
 
1. Introduction  
 
Values represent an important guiding principle in selecting the course of human 
action. We often think of them as principles or yardsticks for choosing, or not, 
specific behaviors. They help us prioritize and judge social conduct as good or bad, 
lawful or unlawful, desirable or undesirable. Values constitute a key building block 
of social systems and their institutions.  
  
Political systems are, on the other hand, often based on ideologies and political 
theories that emphasize the importance of selected social values. Liberal democracy, 
for example, emphasizes individualism, freedom, reason, equality and tolerance. 
These categories form the central pillars of liberal thought. Individual freedom (or 
liberty1) is said to be the core value of liberalism and is given priority over equality 
and justice. This arises naturally from the belief in the individual and the desire to 
ensure that each person is able to act as he or she chooses (Heywood 2007: 45-47)2.  
  
Socialism, on the other hand, stresses the central role of social equality that stems 
from more basic values of community, fraternity and common ownership. Socialism 
highlights the importance of an equality of outcome as opposed to an equality of 
opportunity. Socialists believe that a measure of social equality is the essential 
guarantee of social stability and cohesion. Sympathy for equality also reflects the 
social belief that material benefits should be distributed on the basis of need. 
Liberals do not endorse social equality or an equality of outcome. They rather favor 
legal (equality before law) and political equality (one person, one vote - one vote, 
one value) and equality of opportunity (Wright 1987, Heywood 2007: 53-60). 
  
Neoliberal thought takes liberal notions of individualism and liberty to a different 
level, especially in the relations between the state, the individual and the market. The 
principal goal of neoliberalism is to further minimize the role of the state in the 
market in the belief that unregulated market capitalism will deliver efficiency, 
growth and widespread prosperity. Any kind of state interventionism is viewed with 
   
suspicion and considered damaging. A state with extensive social responsibilities, a 
‘nanny state’, is seen to breed a culture of dependence and to undermine freedom of 
choice in the marketplace. Instead, faith is placed in self-help, individual 
responsibility and business initiative. This kind of thinking is often associated with 
processes surrounding globalization and sometimes identified as neoliberal 
globalization (Harvey 2007: 1-5, Heywood 2007: 52). 
  
Transition from one type of political rule to another requires substantive 
reconfiguration of basic procedural and institutional elements that characterize a 
given type of regime. Among the most common are levels of political participation, 
centralization or fragmentation of governmental power, distribution of rights and 
freedoms between government and citizens, patterns of economic organization, 
stability of political rule and the role of state in society (Share 1987: 525-534). All 
these elements, however, tend to be embedded in a structured system of political 
beliefs and values that reinforce or weaken the linking tissues among those elements, 
which is often termed political culture. 
  
Since democratic transition presupposes an injection of new political values (such as 
private ownership or market liberalization) and infusion of new meanings into older 
values, we may wonder what happens to the older authoritarian values and attitudes. 
Do they disappear from the public psyche or do they remain present? If they remain 
present, how do they interact with the new value structure? These are the questions 
that I would like to address in this paper. 
  
I will attempt to argue that regime change does not eradicate older politico-cultural 
patterns but rather represents a process of augmentation of new political orientations 
with older ones. More specifically, I will suggest that certain authoritarian values, 
beliefs, symbols and similar orientations3 do not disappear but remain present in the 
public consciousness even after the democratic infrastructure has been consolidated.  
  
Here, I will limit myself to a survey of political culture in Slovenia between 1991 
and 2004, an arbitrary transition timeline set between the Slovene Declaration of 
   
Independence and Slovenia’s formal acceptance into the European Union (EU). This 
was also the time when democratic reforms and EU membership criteria were met, 
signaling a certain level of democratic maturation. Although this fixed timeline is 
open to discussion, it is not my intention to pursue further argumentation regarding 
the question of whether transition is still under way or not. 
  
My research will focus on two aspects of political culture in Slovenia. First, I will 
look into the association between public perceptions of freedom and social equality, 
the two core values, one representing the former communist system and the other the 
new democratic system. Second, I will examine the changing perceptions of key 
roles and responsibilities of the state in society. In the context of the general logic 
behind democratic transition it would be expected that in the new political order 
older values would recede and new values strengthen and stabilize. It is my intention 
to inquire into the validity of such approximation. This will also guide my later focus 
on the selected variables.  
 
1.1 Defining basic concepts: democracy, democratization, communism and 
political culture 
 
Before proceeding to the theoretical part of the paper, I would like to clarify some 
key concepts that appear throughout the text. These include democracy, 
democratization, communism and political culture.  
  
Democracy is understood here as a liberal democracy which stands for a particular 
form of democratic rule which balances the principle of limited government against 
the ideal of popular consent. Democracy is often treated as a homogenous 
phenomenon - a system of regular and competitive elections based on a universal 
franchise. There are however rival theories or models of democracy (classical-direct, 
peoples, developmental and protective democracy), each offering its own version of 
popular rule. Liberal democracy as a particular model of democracy is nowdays the 
most common notion and is based on the following features:  
   
 
- constitutional government based on formal, usually legal rules; 
- guarantee of civil liberties and individual rights; 
- institutionalized fragmentation of power and a system of check and balances 
(separation of powers); 
- regular elections; 
- party competition and political pluralism; 
- a private-enterprise economy organized along market lines. 
(Ball and Peters 2000: 54-56) 
 
Democratization is closely associated with the concept of democracy and refers to 
the transition from authoritarianism to liberal democracy. The most important 
features of this process are the granting of basic freedoms and particulary political 
rights, the establishment of popular and competitive elections and (especially in 
post-communist regimes) the introduction of market reforms.  
 
Democratization represents three, sometimes overlapping, processes. First, the old 
regime breaks down (usually this involves the loss of legitimacy) and is generally 
linked to economic failure and faltering loyalty of the police and the military. 
Second, democratic transition goes through the construction of new liberal-
democratic structures and processes. Third, democratic consolidation sees these new 
structures and processes becoming so embedded in the minds of the elites and the 
masses that their removal becomes unthinkable and hence democracy becomes 'the 
only game in town'. In this sense democratic transition denotes a phase in the 
processes of democratization (Przeworski 1991: 66-88). 
 
Recent democratic transitions in East and South-East Europe have included a shift 
from communist political rule to democratic rule. Communism in its simplest sense 
represents the communal organization of social existence on the basis of the 
collective ownership of property. As a theoretical ideal it is most commonly  
 
   
associated with the writings of Karl Marx. The main features of 'orthodox' 
communism as a regime type include: 
 
- Marxism-Leninism as the official ideology; 
- The communist party enjoys a monopoly of political power (one-party system); 
- The communist party dominates the state machine, creating a fused state-party 
apparatus; 
- The communist party plays the leading role in society, controlling all 
institutions, including economic, educational, cultural and recreational 
institutions; 
- Economic life is based on state collectivization. 
(Ball and Peters 2000: 56-58)  
 
The central theme of this paper is built around the concept of political culture. In its 
broadest sense culture represents a way of life of a given community of people. In 
political science, however, the term is used in a narrower sense and refers to the 
psychological orientation of people towards political structures and processes. More 
specifically, political culture stands for a pattern of orientation towards political 
objects, such as state, political parties, government, the constitution, and is expressed 
in beliefs, symbols and values (Hague, Harrop and Breslin 1998: 59). 
 
1.2 Methodological aspects of the study  
 
The empirical data used in this study came from two main sources. Datasets Values 
in Transition, based on the Slovenian Public Opinion Survey (SPOS) and collected 
by the Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre (POMCRC) at the 
University of Ljubljana, formed the base of the survey 4 . The research team of 
POMCRC has been conducting SPOS regularly since 1968 and it remains the most 
comprehensive source of empirical data for social scientists in Slovenia. The second 
source was the World Values Survey (WVS)5, a global database for social scientists 
studying changing values and their impact on social and political life. The WVS has 
been carried out in close collaboration with the European Values Study (EVS)6 and 
   
encompasses data of representative national surveys from ninety-seven societies 
around the globe, containing almost 90 percent of the world's population. These 
surveys show pervasive changes in what people want out of life and in what they 
believe. In order to monitor these changes, the EVS/WVS has executed five waves 
of surveys, from 1981 to 2007. 
  
Next, I would like to address the basic thinking behind the operationalization of 
political culture. Political culture is constituted of three types of psycho-social 
orientation: a cognitive orientation (knowledge and beliefs about the political 
system), an affective orientation (feelings about the political system), and an 
evolutional orientation (commitment to political values and judgments about the 
performance of the political system). These components of political culture are 
normally oriented towards three objective dimensions of politics: structure, process 
and policy (Diamond 1993: 8).  
  
According to Zver (2002) political culture cannot be measured through everyday 
expressions of public opinion. He adopts an operational model that emphasizes 
culture as a sum of values and behaviors that can be empirically measured. Through 
the application of this approach we can measure political culture on three distinctive 
levels of expression: 
 
- Declarative level: opinions regarding the political system, structure and processes; 
- Implicit value level: choices among (opposite) sets of values; 
- Behavioral or participative level: measuring levels of political participation  
 or abstinence. 
 
Since I am interested in the value dimension of political culture, I will concentrate 
on variables of the first two levels. On the declarative level, I will examine attitudes 
towards the previous and current political system (socialism and democracy) and 
levels of trust towards selected political structures. Here I am especially interested in 
the views regarding the role of state in society. On the implicit level, I will look at 
choices between specific values such as freedom and equality.  
   
2. Political culture in theory  
 
Knowing the theoretical background can help us understand why political culture is 
important and how it can help us better understand change in politics of transition. 
Thinking about political culture can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle who 
thought that political culture shapes the political system, especially through 
education (Lukšič 2006: 14).  
  
Modern concerns with political culture originated during WWII when Harold 
Lasswell, Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead and Erich Fromm theorized on the nature 
of ‘national character’. They based their conclusions on anthropological studies of 
childrearing patterns in villages and tribal communities, and on clinical (psychiatric) 
studies. The second period between the 1950s and 1970s was characterized by the 
adoption of more rigorous quantitative methodological approaches that were firmly 
founded on statistical analyses of large populations and subcultures, extensive 
content analysis of media and other procedures. From the 1970s onwards, political 
culture studies lost vigor due to a large influx of concepts and analytic models from 
economics. Rational choice models of political behavior dominated and pushed aside 
the concept of culture until the beginning of the 1990s. After the end of the Cold 
War public choice theorists realized the limitations of rationalistic assumptions and 
began to survey the interrelations between rational models and various “softer” 
factors such as rules, norms, beliefs and values. This reorientation helped to 
recalibrate the usefulness and reapplication of political culture as a valuable research 
concept into mainstream political science (Almond 1993: ix-xii).  
 
   
2.1 Three approaches to political culture 
 
2.1.1 Political culture as an independent variable  
 
This group of scholars echoes Plato and Aristotle and claims that a supportive 
political culture, sustained across generations, contributes to the stability of political 
systems. The core assumption of these theorists is that political culture does matter 
to democracy, independently of other variables, and the development of democratic 
culture cannot be taken for granted as a natural by-product of democratic practice or 
institutional design. Almond and Verba (1963), Dahl (1971), Inkeles and Smith 
(1974) have consistently emphasized the importance of distinctive sets of political 
values and orientations from citizens (moderation, tolerance, civility, efficacy, 
knowledge and participation) for all forms of democratic rule. Also perceptions and 
beliefs regarding political legitimacy have been recognized as important factors 
affecting political stability and sustainability of democratic rule. In their studies they 
addressed patterns of diversity in political beliefs, values and attitudes across various 
countries (Diamond 1993: 1-7). 
 
Almond and Verba’s book The Civic Culture (1963) attempted to identify the 
political culture within which a liberal democracy was most likely to survive and 
develop. They distinguished three pure types of political culture: parochial, subject 
and participant. In the parochial political culture, citizens are only indistinctly aware 
of the existence of a central government. In the subject political culture, citizens see 
themselves not as participants in the political process but as subjects of the 
government. In the participant political culture citizens believe both that they can 
contribute to the system and that they are affected by it. Almond and Verba’s core 
idea was that democracy will prove most stable in societies where subjects and 
parochial attitudes provide ballast to an essentially participant culture. This mix was 
termed civic culture (Hague, Harrop and Breslin 1998: 59).  
  
 
   
In the ideal combination, citizens are sufficiently active in politics to express their 
preferences to rulers but are not so involved as to refuse to accept decisions with 
which they disagree. Political culture, however, is not a solid and immutable force 
and it has a tendency to change. This is what happened in the majority of the 
established democracies in the West. When Almond and Verba updated their work in 
the 1980s, they noted that the emergence of various social movements, economic 
recession, international political events, all affect political culture. For example, 
public support of government has been weakening in the majority of western 
democracies. However, not all changes, core beliefs about the general political 
system remain relatively unaffected (Ibid.: 60).  
  
Putnam (1993) extended Almond and Verba’s work and showed how a political 
culture tends to vary inside a same country, i.e. on a national level political culture 
tends to be diversified. He observed that a positive political culture, built on a 
tradition of trust and cooperation, leads to an effective and stable government. 
Putnam named this tradition of trust and cooperation ‘social capital’, which he 
explained as the ability to foster high levels of unity and cooperation which is 
reflected in stable and effective institutions (Ibid.: 61). 
  
Political culture has been instrumental also in explaining the role of elites during 
various stages of democratization. While complementing Dahl’s contribution, 
Rustow (1970) developed an influential model explaining how democracy emerges 
when a relatively small elite decides, either progressively or in a specific historical 
time, to allow a plurality of opinions while promoting unity and addressing conflicts 
peacefully through agreed rules and procedures.  
  
Later Lijphart (1977) conducted similar work and addressed the role of elites in 
fragmented democracies where he observed the predominate role of the elites in the 
development of a specific culture of rule. Elites operate as a driving force that 
gradually and incrementally stimulate the emergence of democratic culture, initially 
or predominantly at the elite level, and at later stages help to propagate it at the 
general public level (Diamond 1993: 3).  
   
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) developed a model of regime change that explains 
how a schism among elites jump-starts a series of calculation of risk (and interests) 
that leads towards liberalization. Here, however, political culture was given a 
backseat and the authors did not offer any specific explanation as to how changes in 
values, norms, and beliefs stimulate or advance political transition (Ibid.: 4). 
 
A group of authors (Linz and Stepan 1978, Higley and Burton 1989) applied the 
concept of elite political culture in explaining stability and change of political rule 
geared towards democracy. They emphasized the influence of political culture in 
distinguishing consolidated from nonconsolidated democracies. They all stress that 
stability of the system depends on the ability of the elites to consolidate and 
effectively channel mass participation into the mainstream institutions. The ideas of 
the elites are distinct, though they overlap with the national political culture. They 
tend to be more liberal on moral and social issues. In post-communist countries 
leaders defended and argued for a thorough transition to market economy even while 
the mass culture remained more sympathetic to equality in poverty as practiced 
under communism (Ibid.: 6-7). 
 
2.1.2 Political culture as an intervening variable  
 
Political culture does not necessarily have to preclude cultural determinism, i.e. 
political culture does not necessarily predefine political structure and process. We 
can argue that causality works both ways: attitudes affect structure and behavior, and 
structure and performance in turn influence attitudes. Political culture can be easily 
shaped by the performance of a regime, significant historical events and political 
socialization. Among the more significant determinants we could also cite shifts in 
the economic system and social structure, international developments, and so on.  
  
In this sense, the second group of scholars explained political culture as an important 
intervening variable between economic development and democracy. Lipset (1981) 
demonstrated a positive relationship between democratic development and 
democracy, and argued that political beliefs are important intervening variables in 
   
this relationship. He argued that for the long-run success of democracy, there is no 
alternative to economic stability and progress. Economic performance has the power 
to reshape a given political culture. Post-communist countries had to face a lagging 
economic situation and this adjustment tested effectiveness and speed of their 
democratic transition. Furthermore, Inkeles and Diamond (1980) presented more 
direct evidence of the relationship between level of economic development and 
prevalence of democratic attributes. Inglehart (1990) has also shown that political 
culture may be the crucial link between economic development and democracy.  
  
Political culture is subject to change and this can constitute a problem when 
attempting to measure it. As I mentioned above, when Almond and Verba (1963) re-
evaluated their work in the beginning of the 1980s they discovered a considerable 
change. They found strong evidence that the level of socio-economic development, a 
general sense of prosperity and the level of education affect the general attitudes 
towards the political establishment. From their conclusions it has been observed that 
economic miracles and strong economic growth may assist the emergence of more 
positive political attitudes towards political institutions (for example the case of 
West Germany during the 1980s). This may also ignite greater levels of political 
participation among estranged parts of the population. For example, the democratic 
transition of Spain, Greece and Portugal was aided by strong economic growth and 
sustained through their membership in the EU (Ball and Peters 2000: 77-79).  
   
2.1.3. The Marxist tradition 
 
Marx acknowledged the power of ideas, values and beliefs. He wrote with Engels 
that ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which 
is the ruling material force of society is at the same time the ruling intellectual force. 
Ideas and culture are part of the ‘superstructure’ that is determined by the economic 
base (the mode of production). Although Marx bestowed a central place to ideas and 
beliefs of the ruling class (or the elite), in his writings political culture was not 
conceptualized as an independent variable. It formed an integral part of the 
economic base (Heywood 2007: 207). 
   
In general, we can say that Marxist literature explains political culture from two 
theoretical standpoints. The first suggests that political culture is essentially class-
specific: members of the same class share the same experiences, have common 
economic position and interests, they are likely to have broadly similar ideas, values 
and beliefs. The underlying assumption basically asserts that social existence 
determines the consciousness of men. The second theoretical view emphasizes the 
degree to which ideas of the ruling class pervade society and become the ruling ideas 
of the age. From this point of view Marx describes political culture, or civic culture, 
as no more than ‘bourgeois ideology’ which he defines as ideas and theories that 
serve the interests of the bourgeoisie by disguising the contradictions of capitalist 
society. This is important because culture, values and beliefs are conceptualized as a 
form of power (Ibid.: 208).  
  
Modern Marxists, such as Herbert Marcuse or Antonio Gramsci, however, exclude 
the idea of monopolizing bourgeois ideology and rather accept that cultural, 
ideological and political competition does exist. Since ideas and values that uphold 
the capitalist order have an overwhelming advantage over the other ideas and values 
that question it, they also stress that the competition is unequal. This has been 
labeled as ‘ideological hegemony’. Hegemony of ideas and values is often disguised 
behind discourse of free speech, open competition and political pluralism. Herbert 
Marcuse calls this ‘repressive tolerance’ (Ibid.).  
  
Furthermore, Antonio Gramsci drew attention to the degree to which the class 
system is upheld not simply by unequal economic and political power but also by 
bourgeois hegemony. According to him, bourgeois hegemony consists of the 
spiritual and cultural supremacy of the ruling class brought about through the spread 
of bourgeois values and beliefs via civil society: media, religious groups, trade 
unions, social clubs, etc. For Gramsci social change or progress is possible only 
through a ‘battle of ideas’ where one set of principles, theories and values displaces 
the predominant bourgeois ideology (Ibid.).  
 
 
   
3. Political culture in post-communist societies  
 
Why should the concept of political culture carry any significance for the study of 
democratic transition in postcommunist societies? First of all, the process of political 
and economic reconstruction in former communist states has stimulated, since the 
1990s, a renewed interest in the issue of political culture. This is because pervasive 
state control over a number of generations has destroyed or supressed the social 
connections and the sense of civil responsibility that usually sustain democratic 
politics. The public perceived the need to rebuild civil society in the sense of a space 
of autonomous groups and associations, including bussinesses, interest groups, clubs 
and so on. Second, in order to survive, every society must pass on the skills needed 
to perform political roles. No matter how much rulers may want to, they find 
themselves unable to dominate either the process or the content of political 
socialization. Political socialization is largely an uncontrolled and an uncontrollable 
process and it serves as a strong stabilizer that safeguards or even replicates status 
quo. We could say that political culture represents a balancing force that provides a 
major barrier against planned change (Hague, Harrop and Breslin 1998: 64). 
  
In totalitarian regimes there was a greater need to control and shape the basis of the 
underlying political culture. Communism made a systematic effort to transform 
political culture. However, these homogenization efforts for a new type of political 
culture did not materialize and instead evolved into a dual phenomenon: public 
obedience and support of an individual due to fear of reprisal if otherwise and the 
true, hidden persona that retained a set of older attitudes towards politics and society. 
The final collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe in 1989 confirmed the failure 
of the ruling party to reconstruct political culture. The pre-communist cultural 
heritage had outlasted official attempts to reconstruct it. Longstanding cultural 
traditions grew stronger by providing a focus of opposition to communist rule. For 
example, in many post communist states the Catholic Church reemerged as a major 
force and a strong counterweight to communist rule. Communism had not managed 
to extinguish pre-communist political culture. However, democratic transition did 
not prove straightforward either. Reformed communists retained power in many 
   
countries. One of the problems was that pre-communist national political traditions 
were themselves non-, or even anti-, democratic. Pre-communist heritage simply 
offered a weak foundation on which to build a democracy. Moreover, the cultural 
residue of communism further inhibited democratic consolidation. During 
communist rule specific behavioral patterns and mind-sets related to political 
participation had developed which proved to be resilient. As we can see from the 
post-communist experience, totalitarian regimes can influence a country’s political 
culture, often in unexpected ways (Ibid.: 70-71). 
  
Popular attitudes and public expectations regarding a new political system played an 
important role in determining the trajectory and speed of political transition. After 
political reform people expected affluence and comfort overnight. However, these 
expectations were met with a worsened economic situation and higher rates of 
unemployment. Lagging economic growth coupled with higher levels of public 
habituation to economic and social security: inexpensive housing, cheap food, stable 
employment and income. This can be interpreted as another mark of the communist 
period on political culture. It created expectations of a welfare safety net, which did 
not fully survive the transition to market economy. In this sense a given residual of 
political culture from the previous system slowed down the pace of change. 
Economic performance proved to be an important determinate for the perception of 
democratization as both politicians and the political system were mostly judged by 
their ability to deliver goods (Ibid.: 72). 
  
Political culture has a significant influence during the process of political 
reconfiguration and integration. For example, the present political culture in 
Slovenia must be viewed in its larger historical context. Since the mid-19th century 
Slovenes have adopted three distinct political subcultures: catholic (clerical), 
classical liberal and social-democratic. The communist regime put considerable 
effort into the formation of a new political culture of socialist self-management 
which was one of the main features of the Yugoslav type of socialism that made it 
distinct from the Russian type. In the 70s public debate spurred as to the reasons why 
the new self-management culture was struggling and not yielding enduring effects. 
   
The older tradition was indeed suffocating but was not eradicated. Although the 
socialist political culture dominated, older attitudes and values remained hidden and 
persisted through time. Transfer of these older patterns was possible through specific 
processes of political socialization that in their core remained relatively unaltered. 
During the communist era Slovenia nurtured two forms of political attitude: (1) the 
dominant declarative and manifest socialist self-management culture and (2) a mix 
of older political subcultures from the pre-communist era. These two patterns 
persisted through the era of democratic transition and can be empirically discerned 
(Zver 2002: 1001-1002). This leads us now to the empirical part of this paper where 
I will take a closer look at how the predominant attitudes regarding the role of the 
state in society and public attitudes toward the value of liberty and equality shifted 
during democratic transition. 
 
4. The Political culture of Slovenia 1991-2004 
 
4.1 Measuring changes in public perceptions of freedom and social equality 
 
Since 1992, the Slovenian Public Opinion Survey (SPOS) has been actively measuring 
the general public’s perceptions of freedom and equality by asking which is more 
important. This measure stems from the theoretical work on the relation between 
materialists and postmaterialist orientations as developed by Inglehart (1997). The 
underlying assumption is that as democratic institutionalization progresses, the 
importance of freedom as a core political value becomes widely accepted and 
indirectly affects the perception of equality as well. Studies conducted in Slovenia 
between 1991 and 2004 consistently show a gradual shift away from the egalitarian 
concept (Fig. 1). From 1992 to 2000 the intensity of attitudes towards both values 
shows almost equalized values with slight alteration. From 2001 the value of freedom 
is considerably more emphasized and shows signs of gradual intensification (moving 
over 50%). This, however, does not lead to a decrease in the importance of equality, 
which consistently retains the same level of intensity (around 40%) (Toš 2006a: 25).  
  
   
If, however, we attempt to measure both values indirectly, through attitudes towards 
concepts such as socialism, liberalism, capitalism and globalization, we discover that 
the egalitarian principle tends to be rated higher than the liberal one, at least on the 
positive continuum (Fig. 2). The concept of socialism scores a stable positive 
magnitude (over 30%). Capitalism is rated considerably lower (below 20 %), while 
liberalism has been gradually gaining in intensity and sustaining values of around 
30 % (Ibid.: 23). 
 
Fig. 1: What is more important: freedom or equality? 
  
 
(Toš 2006a: 25) 
 
Fig. 2: Attitudes towards socialism, liberalism, globalization and capitalism 
(sum of ‘positive’ and ‘very positive’ replies) 
 
(Toš 2006a: 23) 
   
However, we should not jump to hasty conclusions about people’s stronger 
preferences for socialism over the new political order. The new political system has 
been enjoying an almost absolute support and is not showing any signs of change. 
Close to 90 % of respondents consistently describe the democratic system as good. 
Furthermore, the ratio of those who share neutral feelings towards socialism is 
substantially higher and between 1999 and 2003 in average scored around 39%. 
(Table 1) (Toš 2004: 160-163, 182-186, 448-450). 
 
Table 1: How would you describe your attitudes towards socialism? 
 1999 2000 2003 
NEGATIVE  23.7% 31.1% 21% 
NEUTRAL 44.7% 35% 37.4% 
POSITIVE 23.7% 20.5% 28.3% 
 
 
Similarly, there is a higher level of neutrality towards liberalism. On average 38% of 
respondents answered that they were neutral towards liberal values. Also interesting is a 
noticeable trend of convergence between positive and negative orientations: the negative 
trend has been rising while the positive has been declining (Fig. 3) (Toš 1999: 96-107, 
Toš 2004: 160-163, 182-186, 448-450). 
  
Even though liberal notions of freedom have been gaining acceptance, in general we 
cannot disqualify the assumption that social equality and egalitarian notions of 
society retain strong appeal among Slovenes. This remains clearly discernable 
through attitudes towards socio-economic disparities. On average more than 70% of 
citizens have consistent positive attitudes towards smaller social disparities. The 
structure of answers has not changed through the years (Fig. 4) (Toš 1999: 160-164, 
Toš 2004: 182-186, 448-450). 
 
   
 
Fig. 3: How would you describe your attitudes towards liberalism? 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: How would you describe your attitude towards small social disparities? 
 
 
   
4.2. Changing perceptions regarding role and responsibilities of the state in society 
 
Although from 1991 the quality of life improved considerably, close to 40% of 
Slovenes still believe that life in the present time is worse compared to the past. A 
little less than 20% think that life became better (Fig. 5) (Toš 1999: 2-5, 421-424, 
782-787, Toš 2004: 182-186, 448-450). 
 
Fig. 5: How do people live today compared with 5 years ago? 
 
 
Slovenes think that the state should be doing more, not less in the welfare sector. 
From their point of view the state should retain a higher standard of social service 
and actively balance socio-economic disparity.  The analysis of available data shows 
that among Slovenes there is a predominant sentiment expressing deterioration of 
workers rights and conditions (Fig. 6), worsening employment possibilities (Fig. 7) 
and reduced accessibility to housing (Fig. 8) (Ibid.).  
 
   
 
Fig. 6: Compared with the past how would you describe the current situation of 
workers and workers rights? 
 
 
 
Fig. 7: Compared with the past how would you describe the current 
employment situation? 
 
   
 
Fig. 8: Compared with the past how would you describe current housing 
conditions? 
 
 
Direct questions regarding the role of the state in society reveals strong public feeling 
towards a greater and more active role of the state in society. The majority of Slovenes, 
regardless of their education or socio-economic status, manifest a strong desire to 
maintain a robust welfare state with clearly defined areas of responsibility. These areas 
include healthcare, financial support for students, standards of living for the elderly 
and retired, lessening social-economic disparities between rich and poor, employment 
and housing. Some even support a higher involvement of the state in stimulating 
industrial development, prevention of industrial damage and price control (Fig. 9 and 
Fig. 10). From 1989 until now this general trend has not changed and remains a 
predominant feature of the Slovenian attitude towards the state (Toš 2006b: 9).  
 
   
 
Fig. 9: What should the state be responsible for? 
(Percent of answers: absolutely responsible and partly responsible) 
 
(Toš 2006b: 9) 
 
Fig. 10: What should the state be responsible for? 
(Percent of answers: absolutely responsible and partly responsible) 
 
(Toš 2006b: 9) 
 
   
International comparisons based on the ISSP (International Social Survey 
Programme) show that prevailing trends emphasizing a need for maintaining a strong 
welfare system put Slovenia among other East European states going through 
democratic transition. Similar scores have been reported in Poland, Czech Republic, 
and Hungary. There is also considerable similarity with some Western European 
countries where demands for higher state solidarity have been on the rise: Italy, 
Ireland, France (Ibid.: 10).  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
In the present paper I approached the question of democratic transition through the 
concept of political culture. I started my argument with a short elaboration of the 
role of values in society. I showed how two major political ideologies, liberalism and 
communism, stress the importance of similar values differently. I then emphasized 
their relation towards two values: liberty and equality. This was later linked to my 
overall argument regarding democratic transition.  
  
Through the argumentation put forward in this paper I claimed that democratic 
transition can be thought of as a transition of values. From this I derived the 
hypothesis that during political transition from an authoritarian system to a 
democratic system the older values do not disappear. I based my thinking on the 
empirical characteristics of political culture which is one of the most resilient 
features of political systems. It works as a stabilizer and in the face of change tends 
to retain its rigidness. Evidence of this can be located in the ex-communist states, 
where for example, the pre-communist political values and attitudes have not 
disappeared and have reemerged after the end of the Cold War.   
  
After explaining the various theories and approaches that apply the concept of 
political culture to issues of democratization and economic development, I 
proceeded to the survey of Slovenian democratic transition between the years 1991- 
   
2004. Data concerning Slovenian public perceptions of equality and liberty were 
filtered and analyzed. The results showed a high level of perseverance of positive 
attitudes towards the importance of lower levels of socio-economic disparities.  
  
I also looked at how Slovenes perceived the role and responsibilities of the state in 
society. The public retained high expectations regarding state responsibility in 
providing a wide palette of social services (employment security, education, housing, 
health services, economic development, etc.). Findings confirmed that democratization 
or democratic transition in general does not eradicate older public values, perceptions 
or attitudes regarding equality or liberty. In Slovenia public expectations regarding the 
role of the state in providing extensive social services remain high and do not show 
signs of diminishing.  
  
The replacement of the authoritarian system with a parliamentary free-market system 
that operates on the basis of free expression of plural (competing) interests ignited 
considerable controversy that is especially relevant to the topic of the present paper. 
Similar conclusions have been reached in international comparative studies 
conducted in Central and Eastern Europe where there is a strong declarative 
emphasis on a democratic system, private property rights and a free-market. 
Empirically, however, there is strong opposition to any interference or reform that 
might weaken or shrink the welfare state and social solidarity in the area of public 
health and social security (Toš 2004: 16).  
  
Opposition stems from the specific relation between democracy and economic 
restructuring of post-communist societies experiencing political transition. In this 
context special concern is expressed regarding social equality and the survival of all 
in the shifting social environment. After Slovenia entered democratic transition 
awareness of socio-economic disparities among citizens grew stronger and it has 
remained high until the present day.  
 
   
Rus (in Toš 2004: 17), for example, argues that Slovenes do not think of equality as 
a prerequisite for democracy; they see them as separate concepts which are not 
interchangeable. This could be interpreted as a sign of civic maturation and waning 
of the socialist illusion that social equality could lead to political freedom.  
  
Even though social-economic equality might not be crucial for the perception of 
democracy, it is still a very important factor influencing social equilibrium and 
stability. In this sense a perception of growing social disparity can affect the fate of 
democratic consolidation. Slovenes have been strongly and consistently emphasizing 
the importance of maintaining a vibrant welfare system. Any attempt to diminish 
levels of social security of the lower social stratum is often interpreted as a sign of 
growing crisis in social solidarity. Management of social equality/disparity is also 
important for the maintenance of socio-economic reform and the further 
development of society in general. Slovenes acknowledge the importance of both the 
importance of economic freedom and development based on principles of private 
property and an efficient welfare state. Most public surveys conducted in the 1990s 
point to the conclusion that maintenance of social stability is largely dependent on 
the scope and efficiency of the welfare system or the welfare state.  
  
The importance of a welfare state in the process of democratic transition in post-
communist states has also been documented in other Eastern European societies, and 
not just in Slovenia. Major international surveys in this area point to the general 
expectation that the state will mend socio-economic disparities by supporting an 
efficient welfare system.  
  
The conflicting demands for a weak presence of the state in the economic sector and 
strong presence in the social-welfare sector grew further in intensity (Toš 2004: 19). 
Economic interests demanded further economic liberalization, smaller taxation of 
corporate profits and less state intervention in the market. On the other hand, the 
majority, constituted of the working classes, demanded more state responsibility for 
upholding higher levels of social security and expressed a growing need to secure a  
   
stable social equilibrium through programs to diminish social disparity, promote 
equal access to public goods and for social services (e.g. schools, healthcare and 
pension systems, courts, etc.). In this sense the politico-cultural legacy of the former 
authoritarian system remains present and does not show any sign of disappearing.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1  Here I use both terms interchangeably.  
2  For a comprehensive introduction to the meaning of liberty in political philosophy refer to Barry (1981).  
3 This is often conceptualized as political contra-culture. 
4 Center za raziskovanje javnega mnenja in množičnih komunikacij [Public Opinion and Mass Communication 
Research Centre]. <www.cjm.si> (2010.11.11). 
5 World Values Survey. <www.worldvaluessurvey.org> (2010.11.11). 
6 European Values Study. <www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu> (2010.11.11). 
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